In early 2025, Sudanese officials confirmed that plans for Russia to establish its first-ever naval base in Africa, on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, are moving forward. Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali Youssef stated there are "no obstacles whatsoever" to Russia’s bid, indicating that a long-delayed agreement is now on track. This development holds significant implications for regional security and geopolitics. A Russian naval facility in Sudan – if operational by 2030 – would mark a major expansion of Moscow's military footprint along one of the world's busiest maritime corridors. The analysis below examines the background of this deal, the strategic motivations of Russia and Sudan, and the regional security ramifications expected in the 2025–2030 timeframe.
Russia has pursued a naval base in Sudan for several years, navigating Sudan’s turbulent politics to secure a foothold on the Red Sea. Key milestones include:
2017: Sudan’s then-president, Omar al-Bashir, met with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and reportedly discussed military cooperation, including access for Russian warships at Sudanese ports. Bashir sought Russian support as Sudan faced international isolation and U.S. sanctions, laying the groundwork for a base deal.
2019: Bashir was overthrown in April 2019 after three decades in power. His government had been negotiating a 25-year base agreement with Moscow, which Sudan’s new military rulers put “under review” following the coup. The change in regime cast uncertainty on the fate of the Russian base plan.
2020: In November, President Putin approved the establishment of a Russian naval logistics center at Port Sudan (see image below). A draft agreement envisaged Russia stationing up to four naval vessels at a time, including nuclear-powered warships, with a 25-year lease on the facility. The base would host about 300 Russian military and civilian personnel and serve as a supply and maintenance hub on the Red Sea. However, Sudan’s requirement for legislative ratification and subsequent political upheaval stalled the deal.
2021–2023: Sudan’s internal upheavals delayed implementation. In October 2021, a coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan dissolved the civilian government, and by April 2023 a full-scale war erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Amid this instability, the Russian base agreement remained in limbo, with its status unclear while Sudan was “gripped by a civil war”.
Feb 2025: During a Moscow press conference on February 12, 2025, Sudan’s Foreign Minister announced that Khartoum and Moscow had reached complete agreement on establishing the naval base. “We are in complete agreement on this matter, and there are no obstacles,” he affirmed. This revival of the deal suggests Sudan’s current military leadership is prepared to finalize the base despite the ongoing conflict. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, standing alongside, did not contradict the statement, signaling Kremlin support for moving forward.
Under the terms of the draft agreement, the planned naval facility near Port Sudan would serve as a logistics and resupply center for the Russian Navy. Its key features include accommodating up to four Russian naval vessels concurrently, including nuclear-powered ships. Hosting about 300 Russian personnel (military and civilian), a number that can be increased with Sudan’s consent if needed. Granting Russia permission to import and export weapons, ammunition, and equipment through Sudanese territory to supply the base. This would facilitate Russia in arming and maintaining its forces without Sudanese oversight of inbound/outbound military cargo.
Sudan will provide external security and perimeter defense for the base, while Russia will handle the facility’s internal security, air defense, and the protection of seaward approaches. An initial basing term of 25 years, with automatic extensions unless either party objects, per the 2020 draft. This long-term lease underscores Moscow’s intent to establish a durable presence. If fully realized, the Port Sudan naval base would be Russia’s first naval installation in Africa and only its second major overseas navy base (after Tartus in Syria). The agreement reflects a significant commitment by Khartoum and Moscow to deepen their military partnership.
The Red Sea is a strategic waterway linking the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean via the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. It carries an estimated 12% of global trade, including a substantial portion of Europe-Asia commerce and Persian Gulf energy shipments. This makes the Red Sea a critical chokepoint in international trade. Security and stability in these waters have traditionally been safeguarded by global powers and littoral states working to prevent piracy, terrorism, or any single nation from threatening the shipping lanes.
A Russian naval base on Sudan’s coast would insert Moscow into this already complex strategic environment. It positions Russia to influence a maritime route that Western militaries (such as the U.S. Fifth Fleet and European navies) and regional players have dominated for decades. Indeed, Moscow’s presence in Sudan intensifies geopolitical competition, challenging Western influence in a region long under Western security umbrellas. The United States maintains a major base in nearby Djibouti (Camp Lemonnier), and France, Italy, Japan, and China also have military facilities or contingents there. Russia establishing its own Red Sea foothold means that by 2030, all five permanent UN Security Council members could have a military presence in the Horn of Africa/Red Sea arena.
Strategically, a Red Sea base extends Russia’s reach along the critical corridor connecting the Indo-Pacific to the Mediterranean. This move deepens the Kremlin’s Indo-Mediterranean presence and complicates regional stability. In effect, Russia can more seamlessly link its naval operations from the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea to its naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean (Syria), creating a chain of influence across two seas and an ocean. Such a development is viewed by Western defense officials as a potential threat to their interests in the region. For example, Italy has raised security concerns, as it operates its own support base in Djibouti only a few hundred miles across the Red Sea from Port Sudan.
The concentration of multiple great powers in the Red Sea heightens its strategic profile but also the risk of friction. Naval forces from the U.S., NATO allies, China, and now Russia will be operating in closer proximity. This could lead to occasional standoffs or surveillance of each other’s activities, reminiscent of Cold War dynamics. On the other hand, it could also encourage ad hoc cooperation (for instance, against piracy or smuggling) if interests align. Overall, Russia’s entry via a Sudanese base symbolizes a shift toward a more multipolar Red Sea region, where no single power unilaterally controls the security environment.
For Moscow, establishing a naval presence on Sudan’s Red Sea coast serves multiple strategic objectives. A base in Sudan allows Russia to project naval power into the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and northwest Indian Ocean. It extends the reach of Russia’s navy beyond home waters and the Mediterranean, enabling Russian warships to operate for longer durations in the Indian Ocean region and even venture toward the Persian Gulf or East Africa with logistical support. This kind of reach has not been seen since the Soviet era, when the USSR had access to ports like Berbera in Somalia. By 2025–2030, a Port Sudan facility could support deployments for patrols, exercises, or crisis response far from Russia’s shores – significantly enhancing Moscow’s global naval presence.
The move is a direct challenge to U.S. and Western naval dominance in a critical waterway. A Russian foothold on the Red Sea gives Moscow a say in a region that Western allies have traditionally policed. It provides Russia with leverage over a maritime chokepoint that is vital to Western economies and military logistics (for example, U.S. Navy ships transiting between the Mediterranean and Indo-Pacific). This complicates Western strategic planning; as Moscow’s Red Sea push tightens its grip on key trade routes in defiance of Western preferences. In any future East-West crisis, Russia’s ability to disrupt or monitor Red Sea traffic could become a factor.
The Sudan base offers Russia a hedge against potential troubles at its other overseas base in Tartus, Syria. Russia’s military presence in Syria depends on the new Syrian regime’s stability, and Syria has asked Russia for reparations. Should Syria become untenable or more hostile to Moscow in the future, the Port Sudan base would serve as an alternate anchor for Russian naval operations in the region. Observers have noted that the prospect of losing the Tartus base is one reason Russia accelerated plans for a Red Sea base Similarly, Russia has shown interest in other locations like Libya’s eastern coast to expand its naval network. A Sudan base, therefore, is part of a broader strategy to ensure Russia isn’t confined to its home ports or reliant on a single foreign host.
A permanent military installation bolsters Russia’s geopolitical influence in Africa. It complements Russia’s other activities on the continent – such as arms sales, mining investments, and security assistance (often via private military contractors like the Wagner Group). The base would be a tangible symbol of Russia’s commitment to African partners. It also provides a staging point to support Russian operations or allies elsewhere in Africa if needed. For example, Russian naval vessels could use Port Sudan as a stop to deliver military hardware or provide training along African coasts. Gaining a “gateway to Africa” is strategically valuable for Moscow, especially after the loss of Soviet-era access (e.g., the former Soviet navy base in Berbera, Somalia, during the Cold War). In short, the base solidifies Russia’s role as a security player on the African continent, not just an external arms supplier.
Russia has framed its Red Sea naval plans partly in terms of contributing to regional security – notably, combating piracy. The Gulf of Aden and Red Sea have seen piracy threats (particularly in the late 2000s off Somalia), and Russian naval contingents have participated in international anti-piracy patrols. A local support base would improve Russia’s ability to sustain such missions. A Russian analyst noted the base will help Russian ships fight pirates in the region while advancing Russia’s economic and military projects in Africa. Beyond piracy, having a Red Sea hub would allow Russia to safeguard its own commercial shipping and any energy interests more effectively. It also positions Russia to potentially monitor or patrol strategic maritime chokepoints in conjunction with allies (for instance, coordinating with the Chinese navy’s anti-piracy efforts out of Djibouti).
The base agreement’s terms granting Russia rights to import and export weaponry through Sudanese territory are a significant perk. This means Russia can funnel arms and military equipment to and from Africa with fewer hurdles, using Port Sudan as a transshipment point. It could bolster Russia’s ability to supply client states or proxy forces in the region discreetly. Additionally, a stable presence in Sudan could aid Russian companies in securing resource concessions (such as Sudanese gold mining or oil exploration rights), knowing Russia has both a stake in the country’s security and the means to logistically support operations. In essence, the base not only projects power but also creates a secure channel for Russia’s military-economic activities in Africa. Notably, at least one Sudanese general indicated that Russia had offered weapons and ammunition in exchange for basing rights – highlighting that arms supply is a core facet of the quid pro quo. Over 2025–2030, we can expect Russia to leverage the base to reinforce its arms trade and perhaps to facilitate the movement of other valuable commodities under Russian purview.
From Khartoum’s point of view, hosting a Russian naval base comes with both opportunities and risks. Sudan’s military-led government (the de facto authority since the 2021 coup) is calculating that the benefits – in terms of regime security and international backing – outweigh the potential downsides. However, the decision is entwined with Sudan’s ongoing internal conflict and its precarious foreign relations.
Sudan’s ruling generals see Russia as a crucial source of security assistance at a time of existential threats. During Sudan’s current civil war, Moscow has provided diplomatic cover for the military government. In late 2024, for example, Russia used its UN Security Council veto to block a draft resolution on Sudan, thereby shielding Khartoum from international punitive action. On the ground, there are indications of Russian military support: the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor, had ties to Sudan (including reported support to the RSF earlier in the conflict), and Russia has long been a major arms supplier to Sudan’s army. By solidifying a base agreement, Sudan’s leadership secures an even stronger commitment of Russian backing. In essence, the base is part of a bargain – Khartoum grants Moscow strategic access, and in return it gains a powerful ally to help ensure the regime’s survival in the face of internal rebellion or external pressure.
Aligning with Russia gives Sudan a major-power patron at a time when its relations with the West are severely strained. Since the 2021 coup and the outbreak of war in 2023, Western nations have cut off most aid and diplomatic engagement with Sudan, demanding a return to civilian rule. The U.S. has warned that Sudan’s choice of partners will have “consequences”, implying further isolation if Khartoum partners with Moscow.
Facing this Western isolation, Sudan’s generals are turning to Russia (and other non-Western powers) to fill the void. Russia does not condition its support on democratic reforms or human rights, making it an attractive ally for a regime focused on its own survival. Moreover, Sudan can leverage the Russia relationship to send a message to the West: that Khartoum has other options and won’t bow to Western pressure. This multipolar balancing act is a page from former President Bashir’s playbook – he too relied on Russian and Chinese support when shunned by the U.S.. In the 2025–2030 period, a successful partnership with Russia could help Sudan withstand sanctions and possibly negotiate from a stronger position internationally.
The promise of a Russian base – and the support that comes with it – may impact the outcome of Sudan’s internal conflict. The SAF (led by Gen. al-Burhan) can expect increased military aid or at least maintenance of existing Russian-supplied hardware as an incentive for making the base a reality. There are reports that Russia has courted both warring sides to hedge its bets (Wagner operatives liaised with RSF leader Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo in the past), but as the war drags on, Moscow’s interest aligns more with a strong, unified Sudanese military that can secure the country (and thus secure the base). Indeed, the SAF’s recent battlefield gains in Khartoum bolster the generals’ position and, by extension, Russia’s likelihood of getting the base. If and when the SAF defeats the RSF or forces a settlement, the Sudanese military will be indebted to allies like Russia and likely to honor commitments such as the base deal. In short, Russia’s engagement could tilt the scales of the civil war in the military’s favor, and the base is both a reward and a forward investment in a post-war order dominated by the SAF.
Although much of the focus is on security, Sudan also hopes for economic and developmental side-benefits from the Russian base. The presence of Russian forces might bring infrastructure upgrades to Port Sudan and the surrounding area – construction of facilities, improved ports and roads, power supply, etc. Russia may also provide financial compensation or in-kind support; for example, discounted oil or wheat, or investment in Sudan’s mining sector (Russia has shown interest in Sudan’s rich gold reserves). These tangible benefits are attractive for a country in economic crisis. Additionally, having Russia as a stakeholder in Sudan’s stability could encourage further trade and investment from Russian companies. Unlike Western investors, Russian (and perhaps Chinese) businesses might be more willing to engage in Sudan despite the conflict, especially if they know Russian security forces are on the ground to protect assets. All of this could help Sudan’s beleaguered economy in the long run. The Sudanese leadership can use the prospect of Russian investment to tout that they are opening new economic partnerships, not just hosting foreign troops.
Moving forward with a Russian base risks antagonizing the United States and Europe, potentially deepening Sudan’s diplomatic isolation. The U.S. ambassador already cautioned in 2022 that hosting a Russian military facility would “isolate Sudan from the international community” and "undermine [Sudan’s] interests". This warning suggests Sudan could face penalties such as stricter sanctions, loss of international aid, or reduced access to global financial systems. Given Sudan’s dire humanitarian situation, further isolation could worsen economic hardships for the population. Also, Sudan’s hopes of eventually normalizing relations with the West (and getting relief from debt or sanctions) might be jeopardized by the long-term presence of Russian forces. In essence, Khartoum is trading short-term regime security for a potential long-term estrangement from much of the international community.
Allowing a foreign power a 25-year lease on Sudanese territory raises questions about sovereignty. Even if Sudan retains formal ownership of the base site, a Russian-manned facility could become a quasi-extraterritorial enclave. Sudanese officials insist they will maintain control and reject any unwanted foreign dictate, but in practice, once Russian troops are on the ground, Khartoum’s ability to ask them to leave or to oversee their activities will be limited. This dependency on Russia for security and economic perks could constrain Sudan’s future policy choices. For instance, Sudan might feel compelled to support Russia’s positions in international forums or make concessions (such as exclusive mining rights) to keep Moscow’s favor. A future Sudanese government – say a civilian-led one if the country transitions to peace and democracy – might find its hands tied by the binding agreement signed by the generals. Abrogating the deal could be dangerous or costly if Russia strongly objects. Thus, Sudan may be locked into a long-term alignment that not all its stakeholders or public agree with, raising sovereignty sensitivities.
By hosting a Russian base, Sudan entangles itself in great-power rivalries that could play out on its soil. If tensions spike between Russia and other major powers, Sudan might become a target of proxy conflicts or espionage. In a worst-case scenario, if there were military hostilities involving Russia, the base in Sudan could itself become a target for strikes or blockades by Russia’s adversaries. Even short of open conflict, the presence of the base could invite covert activities by intelligence services (spying, sabotage) in and around Port Sudan. Additionally, regional adversaries of Russia or Sudan might support rebel groups or political opposition in Sudan as a countermeasure. For example, countries uneasy about the Russian base might quietly empower factions within Sudan to pressure the government. This external interference would further destabilize Sudan. Internally, Islamist or nationalist sentiments might rise against a foreign military presence, potentially fueling insurgency or terrorist threats targeting Russian personnel. The Sudanese authorities would then have to contend not only with the current civil war but also protect the foreign base from new threats.
Sudan also must consider the reaction of its neighbors and regional blocs. Its relationship with Egypt is strong at the moment (with Cairo backing Sudan’s military), but if Egypt perceived the Russian base as upsetting the regional balance or drawing Sudan into an Iranian orbit, that could cause friction. Relations with Ethiopia are already tense (over Nile waters and a border dispute); Ethiopia might worry if Sudan brings in a big-power patron that could side against Ethiopian interests. Within the Arab League and African Union, some members are uncomfortable with foreign bases in Africa. Sudan’s move could set a precedent that those organizations publicly discourage. Khartoum may face quiet disapproval from allies like Saudi Arabia, who prefer Sudan stable but not a platform for rival powers. While outright condemnation is unlikely (many regional players are hedging between big powers themselves), Sudan could see a cooling of support or cooperation from certain neighbors concerned about the long-term implications of a Russian naval hub on the Red Sea.
Sudan’s embrace of the Russian base reflects a strategic bet by its military rulers: that Russian support will secure their rule and national interests in the short-to-medium term. However, this comes at the cost of antagonizing Western nations and potentially compromising Sudan’s autonomy. The true impact on Sudan will depend on how the civil war resolves and whether the promised benefits from Russia materialize sufficiently to offset the risks of international isolation and entanglement in great-power rivalry.
The establishment of a Russian naval base in Sudan reverberates across international and regional security circles. Reactions range from alarm in Western capitals to cautious calibration among Middle Eastern and African states, and quiet interest in Beijing.
The United States and its NATO/EU allies view Russia’s Red Sea naval foray with deep concern. Washington has made it clear to Sudan’s leaders that siding with Russia militarily is unwelcome. In a 2022 interview, the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan warned that if Khartoum allowed a Russian base on the Red Sea, it would “isolate Sudan from the international community” and could “undermine the country’s interests”. He emphasized that while Sudan has a sovereign right to partner with whom it chooses, such choices have consequences – a thinly veiled reference to the risk of sanctions or loss of Western support. This U.S. warning came even before the war escalated; now with the base deal moving forward, Western officials are likely doubling down on their position.
More broadly, Western strategists see the Russian base as part of Moscow’s effort to expand its military influence and challenge the West in new theaters. From their perspective, a Russian naval hub at the Red Sea’s doorstep threatens to disrupt the balance of power along a vital trade artery. European nations, many of which contribute to Red Sea maritime security missions (e.g., anti-piracy operations), share the unease. Reports indicate Western officials are “disturbed” by the deepening Russian-Sudanese military cooperation, viewing it as a threat to Western interests in the region.
In practical terms, the U.S. and allies are expected to respond by bolstering their own posture rather than direct confrontation. The U.S. maintains Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti (the largest American base in Africa) and regularly deploys naval assets to the Red Sea; this presence will likely be sustained or increased to monitor Russian activities. NATO navies and the EU could intensify port visits and joint drills with friendly Red Sea states (like Djibouti or Egypt) to signal their commitment to freedom of navigation. Intelligence surveillance of Port Sudan will intensify as well. Diplomatically, Western countries may continue pressuring Sudan’s government behind closed doors, offering incentives to rethink the deal or at least to limit Russia’s usage of the base. However, given Russia’s veto power on the UN Security Council, multilateral action (like UN sanctions related to the base) is improbable. Thus, Western powers will have to rely on unilateral and coalition measures to hedge against the new Russian presence. The overall Western reaction is likely to remain one of wary containment: accepting that the base might go forward, but ensuring it does not significantly threaten Western interests or allied countries in the region.
Regional responses to the Russian base are mixed, shaped by each country’s strategic interests and relations with both Sudan and Russia: Egypt shares a long border with Sudan and has been a close ally of the Sudanese military leadership. Cairo’s primary concern is stability in Sudan and keeping Islamist or hostile forces out of power, rather than the presence of Russia per se. In fact, Egypt has a cooperative relationship with Russia (e.g. purchasing Russian weapons and nuclear reactors) and is unlikely to object loudly to a Russian naval base that props up the Sudanese army. Egyptian officials might even welcome that a great power is invested in Sudan’s security, so long as Egypt’s own access to the Red Sea (via the Suez) isn’t impeded. We can expect Egypt to quietly accept the Russian base, while ensuring that Egyptian interests (such as intelligence sharing or use of Port Sudan in certain cases) are respected. Any sign that Russia’s presence could empower Ethiopia (Egypt’s rival over Nile waters) or an Iranian foothold would change Cairo’s calculus, but at present Egypt sees the SAF and its partners (Russia included) as aligned with Egyptian regional goals.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two influential Red Sea-adjacent powers, have a nuanced stance. Both nations have invested in Sudan’s stability (the UAE and Saudi supported Sudan’s junta financially after the 2021 coup) and they maintain working ties with Russia. They have cooperated with Russia in OPEC+ to manage oil markets, indicating a pragmatic relationship. However, Saudi Arabia in particular views the Red Sea as its strategic backyard and has historically been wary of non-Arab powers establishing bases around it. A Russian base in Port Sudan lies just across from the Saudi coast. The Gulf states will be concerned if the base becomes an entry point for Iranian influence or if it leads to advanced Russian weapons (like air defense systems) stationed in Sudan that could alter the security balance. So far, there’s no public condemnation from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi – they may tolerate the base as long as Russia remains a partner to them as well. Expect the Gulf monarchies to quietly engage Moscow and Khartoum, seeking assurances that the base’s presence will not threaten their interests or maritime traffic. They might also increase their own outreach in Sudan (through investment or security cooperation) to avoid ceding all influence to Russia. In summary, the Gulf states’ reaction is cautious: not overtly hostile, but watchful and prepared to counter any negative fallout.
Iran’s role in this equation is significant behind the scenes. Tehran has historically vied for influence in Sudan (especially under Bashir, when Iran used Sudan as a conduit for arms to proxies). In the current conflict, reports indicate Iran has supplied drones to Sudan’s military, suggesting Tehran is backing the SAF to some degree. Iran would likely applaud a Russian base that cements an anti-Western alliance on the Red Sea. Closer military ties between Sudan and Russia could ease the way for Iran to also rebuild military cooperation with Sudan – perhaps visiting Port Sudan with its warships or sharing intelligence. This possibility deeply concerns Israel and Sunni Arab states.
Israel, which is not on the Red Sea but has a strategic outlet to it (via the Gulf of Aqaba), has been working to normalize relations with Sudan as part of the Abraham Accords process. A Sudan that becomes a stronghold of Russian and Iranian influence complicates Israel’s outreach. Israel is wary of any Iranian presence near the Red Sea shipping lanes (through which Israeli commerce flows) and the prospect of Sudan once again hosting Iranian arms destined for Hezbollah. Thus, Israel is likely lobbying the U.S. and international partners to contain the growth of Iranian and Russian influence in Sudan. If Russia’s base remains purely Russian, Israel might be mildly uneasy; but if Iranian naval or Revolutionary Guard elements gain a foothold in Sudan under the umbrella of Russian cooperation, Israel’s stance would harden considerably. In that scenario, covert Israeli action (such as intelligence operations or even strikes like those it conducted in Sudan in the 2000s against Iranian arms convoys) could come back into play, risking a wider regional conflict. For now, this remains a contingency – much hinges on how far Russia allows Iran to piggyback on its Sudan presence.
Sudan’s African neighbors have their own views. Eritrea, which lies directly across the Red Sea, has no formal objection – Asmara has itself been isolated from the West and might welcome a Russia-backed Sudan as a fellow anti-Western partner. Eritrea allowed the UAE to use its ports during the Yemen war and could similarly be amenable to Russian naval visits or logistics if asked.
Ethiopia, a landlocked country dependent on Red Sea ports, will be attentive to any shifts in port access. Ethiopia might see a Russian base in Sudan as a net positive if it stabilizes Sudan (keeping trade routes open) and perhaps deters Eritrea or Egypt from aggressive moves. However, Ethiopia would not want the Red Sea to become an arena of conflict that could endanger its shipping. The African Union (AU), headquartered in Ethiopia, preaches African solutions to African problems and might philosophically disapprove of new foreign bases. Yet, the AU is constrained in influencing sovereign decisions—especially since some AU members themselves host foreign bases (Djibouti, for example). We might see the AU or regional bodies like IGAD urge that the Red Sea be kept free of great-power rivalry, but these statements carry little weight against the interests of Sudan’s government.
Regional powers are adopting a watch-and-see approach. Allies of Sudan’s military (Egypt, some Gulf states) are tacitly supportive or neutral, hoping the base will shore up Sudan’s government and not harm their own positions. Rivals and wary neighbors (Israel, possibly others) are concerned mainly about the worst-case extensions of Russian presence (such as Iranian involvement or weapons proliferation). The next few years will reveal whether Russia can integrate its Sudan base into the region without triggering a regional arms race or conflict. How Russia manages relationships with other key actors like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel in relation to the base will be critical for regional acceptance.
China is a major stakeholder in the Red Sea region due to its heavy reliance on Middle East–Europe trade and its investments in Africa. Beijing established its own naval base in Djibouti in 2017, reflecting China’s global maritime ambitions. In principle, China is not opposed to another non-Western power bolstering its presence in the Red Sea. Beijing and Moscow often find common cause in diluting Western dominance. A Russian base in Sudan could indirectly benefit China by diverting Western attention and resources, and it opens the door for potential China-Russia naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean arena. We might eventually see Chinese and Russian fleets coordinating patrol patterns or port visits in support of mutual interests (for instance, both navies have participated in joint drills with Iran in other waters).
That said, China will approach this development with cautious pragmatism. Beijing’s paramount interest is the stability of shipping lanes for commerce. If a Russian base led to greater instability or confrontation in the Red Sea, that would threaten Chinese interests. Chinese leaders will likely seek assurances from Moscow (through their close diplomatic channels) that the Port Sudan facility is for defensive and logistical purposes, not power projection that could disrupt trade. Publicly, China is apt to remain neutral or quiet about the base – it traditionally avoids commenting on other nations’ base agreements. Privately, it may welcome Russia’s expanded role as part of a broader alignment against Western pressure, especially since China itself faces U.S. naval presence in East Asian waters. In sum, China’s reaction will be one of tacit support so long as the Russian base contributes to a multipolar balance and does not create chaos that imperils Chinese interests.
India, another important global maritime actor, will observe the Red Sea developments through the lens of Indian Ocean security. India has cordial ties with Russia (a legacy of the Cold War and defense cooperation), so it is not likely to protest the Sudan base. Indian strategists are more concerned about Chinese bases and influence in the Indian Ocean. In that regard, a Russian base in the Red Sea is not seen as a direct challenge to India. However, India does value the stability of the sea lanes from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, as a significant portion of India’s trade passes through Suez. New Delhi will quietly monitor the situation to ensure the Russian presence remains a factor of stability (or at least neutrality) and not an expansion of Chinese naval reach by proxy. If Russia and China were to coordinate closely in the region, India might grow warier. But given India’s own friendly relations with Russia, it may even explore dialogues with Moscow about using Port Sudan for anti-piracy efforts or other cooperative security tasks that align with Indian interests.
Turkey is a regional power with historical interest in Sudan. Under President Erdoğan, Turkey had an agreement in 2017 to rehabilitate Sudan’s Red Sea island of Suakin, which many suspected was a cover for a possible Turkish naval facility. That project stalled after Bashir’s ouster in 2019 and the subsequent Sudanese pivot toward Gulf allies. Now, with Russia stepping in at Port Sudan, Turkey finds itself edged out of a role in Sudan’s coastal security. As a NATO member, Turkey is formally aligned with Western concerns about Russian military expansion. However, Turkey also pursues an independent policy and has cooperative dealings with Russia (e.g., in Syria and in energy trade). Ankara’s response may be muted – it likely won’t challenge the Russian base directly. Instead, Turkey might refocus on expanding its military partnerships elsewhere in Africa (as it has been doing, for instance, in Somalia and West Africa) rather than competing in Sudan. If down the line Sudan stabilizes and seeks diversified partnerships, Turkey could try to re-engage economically or in training Sudan’s forces, but the presence of the Russian base will mean Sudan’s primary security patron is already chosen.
The wider international context cannot be ignored. The years 2025–2030 come after a low point in Russia-West relations due to the Ukraine conflict. Russia’s move in Sudan can be seen as part of its effort to showcase that it still has global reach and partners despite Western sanctions. Western powers, on the other hand, will be balancing the Sudan issue alongside ongoing tensions in Eastern Europe and the Pacific. It is possible that Sudan becomes an arena for indirect competition: for example, increased Western support to Egypt or East African peacekeeping missions to counter Russian influence. Conversely, if global tensions ease (for instance, a resolution in Ukraine or improved U.S.-Russia dialogue), Sudan could become an area of pragmatic cooperation (such as joint anti-piracy operations that include Russia). However, given current trends, competition is the more likely scenario.
Beyond the West and the immediate region, the reaction to Russia’s Sudan base is largely shaped by each actor’s rivalry or alignment with major powers. China quietly cheers a weaker Western hand in the Red Sea, India keeps a cautious watch, and Turkey adapts to a diminished role. The Red Sea, once somewhat peripheral in global geopolitics, is increasingly a stage where global power dynamics play out, with Russia’s new base acting as a catalyst.
The establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast is poised to be a geopolitical game-changer for the latter half of the 2020s. If current plans hold, by 2030 Russia will have an operational stronghold astride one of the world’s most strategic waterways. This will mark a notable shift towards a more multipolar presence in the Red Sea, ending an era of uncontested Western maritime dominance in the region. Russia, Sudan, regional states, and Western powers will all have to adjust to the new reality shaped by this development.
For Russia, a Port Sudan base would fulfill a long-sought objective of extending its military influence into the Red Sea/Indian Ocean arena, significantly enhancing its global naval posture. It will serve as a tangible symbol of Russia’s return to Africa and its challenge to the Western-led international order. Moscow will likely do everything it can to fortify and retain this foothold, as indicated by the high-level political capital already invested. How effectively Russia manages the base – balancing power projection with regional goodwill – will influence its success. Responsible use (e.g., contributing to anti-piracy or not interfering with commerce) could legitimize its presence, whereas any aggressive moves could rally opposition against it.
For Sudan, the coming years will test whether hosting a great power base delivers the stability and relief its leaders hope for. In the best case, the partnership with Russia helps the Sudanese military win the civil war, rebuild state authority, and perhaps eventually negotiate a peace that includes a civilian government – with Russia as a guarantor of Sudan’s security. Economically, Russian investment and aid tied to the base could provide a modest boost. However, there is also a distinct risk that Sudan becomes overly dependent on Moscow and alienated from much of the international community, which could hamper long-term development and recovery. Much will depend on how the SAF conducts itself: a continued brutal war or human rights abuses could trigger international blowback that even Russia’s veto cannot fully shield Sudan from. Conversely, moves toward an inclusive political settlement (even if influenced by Russia) might soften Western stances over time.
The broader region will enter a new strategic chapter once the Russian base is active. A balance-of-power dynamic may take hold in the Red Sea, with navies of multiple powers operating with an eye on each other. While this could create a more stable deterrence (no one power can act aggressively without being checked by another), it also means any local crisis might quickly draw in outside intervention or become a proxy showdown. The proximity of various foreign bases (U.S., French, Chinese in Djibouti; Russian in Sudan; potentially others in the future) will require communication channels and perhaps new agreements to prevent accidents or misunderstandings at sea. There is precedent for this – in the Gulf of Aden, multi-national task forces (including Western, Chinese, Indian, Russian ships) have coordinated against piracy. The hope is that a similar pragmatic approach will govern interactions in the Red Sea despite underlying rivalries.
The security implications of Russia’s naval base in Sudan will be significant and multifaceted. On one hand, it adds a layer of strategic deterrence and could contribute to collective efforts like anti-piracy patrols. On the other hand, it represents the widening of great-power competition into yet another critical region, with uncertain consequences for peace and stability. Stakeholders in Sudan, the region, and the international community will need to navigate this reality carefully. By 2030, the Red Sea could either emerge as an example of cautious power-sharing and coexistence – or as a hotspot of heightened rivalry. The trajectory will largely depend on how responsibly Russia and Sudan handle their newfound military partnership, and how the rest of the world chooses to engage with or respond to this new presence on Africa’s Red Sea coast.
