Barely weeks into his new term, U.S. President Donald Trump stunned Ukraine and America’s European allies by phoning Russia’s Vladimir Putin to discuss ending the war in Ukraine – without consulting Kyiv or NATO beforehand . That surprise initiative led to a high-stakes diplomatic meeting in Riyadh, the first direct U.S.-Russia peace talks since the invasion began. American and Russian officials sat down for 4½ hours in the Saudi capital to press for ways to halt Europe’s deadliest conflict since World War II . Notably absent were Ukraine and the Europeans, heightening anxieties that a deal could be struck over their heads. Even before the delegations arrived, European politicians accused Washington of making free concessions to Moscow – pointing to Trump’s recent remarks ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine and dismissing Kyiv’s hopes of reclaiming all occupied land .
U.S. officials insist this back-channel diplomacy is merely a first step, not a final settlement. They stress that no one will be sidelined and any peace must be “acceptable to all parties,” including Ukraine and European partners . Trump’s team agreed with Moscow to appoint high-level envoys to negotiate an “enduring, sustainable” end to the conflict and discussed restoring U.S.-Russia diplomatic ties severed by the war . For its part, the Kremlin welcomed the talks but immediately hardened its stance: Russia’s foreign ministry declared that it’s “not enough” for NATO to simply deny Ukraine entry – the alliance must formally cancel its 2008 pledge that Ukraine could join one day. Moscow also warned it would never accept NATO troops on Ukrainian soil, even as peacekeepers . No date was set for any Trump-Putin summit, but both men signaled interest in a face-to-face deal . The fast-moving diplomacy has nevertheless unnerved Ukraine and its neighbors: officials in Kyiv flatly reject any outcome imposed “behind Ukraine’s back” and postponed a planned visit to Saudi Arabia in protest . In European capitals, alarm bells are ringing that Washington and Moscow could cut a grand bargain that ignores Europe’s security interests or Ukraine’s sovereignty. As one European analyst put it, February 2025 has shown that Americans “no longer feel responsible for European security” – a stark turn after decades under the U.S. protective umbrella .
Behind the jostling for a peace deal lies an economic undercurrent: Ukraine’s vast mineral riches have become part of the bargaining. President Trump has made no secret that he wants something in return for U.S. support – namely, a share of Ukraine’s rare earths and critical metals. In an Oval Office quip, he mused that Ukraine should “secure what we’re giving them with their rare earths”, and asked for the equivalent of $500 billion worth of these minerals as part of any deal . This transactional approach has prompted Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to dangle a partnership: he unfurled geological maps in his office during a recent interview, eager to show that Ukraine sits on a treasure trove of critical minerals . Ukraine holds deposits of 22 out of the 34 minerals the EU deems essential for high-tech and defense industries . That includes some of Europe’s largest known reserves of titanium (vital for aerospace) and uranium, huge lithium reserves (about 500,000 tons, key for batteries), and an estimated 20% of the world’s graphite, indispensable for electric vehicles and nuclear reactors. In sum, the potential wealth under Ukrainian soil is extraordinary – one recent analysis valued Ukraine’s critical mineral deposits at around $12 trillion (ballooning to $26 trillion if oil, gas and coal are included).
Control of these resources is a strategic prize woven into the conflict. Russian forces occupy chunks of eastern and southern Ukraine that are rich in minerals and metals. Some observers claim Moscow now holds sway over the majority of Ukraine’s mineral wealth – figures as high as 70% are cited for resources in occupied territories . Ukrainian officials dispute that. Zelenskiy argues that less than a fifth of Ukraine’s overall mineral resources (though roughly half its known rare earth deposits) are currently under Russian occupation. Whichever figure is accurate, there is no doubt that both East and West see Ukraine’s resource endowment as leverage. For Russia, keeping conquered land means retaining mines and metals that could fuel its industries (or be bartered with allies like China and Iran). For the West, partnering with Ukraine on resource extraction offers a way to dent China’s dominance in critical minerals and ensure Ukraine’s post-war economic viability. Any peace negotiation, therefore, is about maps and minerals – drawing lines on the ground while divvying up who benefits from Ukraine’s buried wealth. This adds an extra layer of complexity to talks: beyond questions of sovereignty and security guarantees, the future of Ukraine’s mines, metals, and rare earths is on the table.
Europeans have watched these developments with a mix of anxiety and resolve. Feeling shut out from the U.S.-Russia parleys, leaders from across the EU hastily convened in Paris to coordinate their stance . There, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Olaf Scholz joined others in warning against any rushed ceasefire that fails to secure a durable peace . They agreed that any settlement must come with “robust and reliable” security guarantees for Ukraine – commitments that Europe itself may have to underwrite if U.S. support wavers . One controversial idea on the table is a European peacekeeping force to police a potential truce, although EU leaders are divided on sending troops. Britain’s Prime Minister (keen to show post-Brexit leadership) said the UK could contribute forces to an international peacekeeping mission, but others remain wary without a full peace deal in hand. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, for instance, cautioned that deploying European soldiers into Ukraine would be “complex” and possibly ineffective . In these discussions, however, one consensus did emerge: Europe must strengthen its own defences in response to the new realities.
After decades of under-investment, European countries are openly talking about ramping up military spending. At the Paris summit, leaders even suggested loosening the EU’s budget-deficit rules so that surging defense outlays won’t breach fiscal limits . “Russia is threatening all of Europe now,” Denmark’s prime minister warned, arguing that the continent must rapidly build up its security muscles. Already the trend is unmistakable: European military budgets have seen their steepest spike in a generation, with 2022 spending in Central and Western Europe climbing about 13% – surpassing even late Cold War levels . Governments from Finland to Poland have announced multi-year defense expansions, and the NATO guideline of 2% of GDP for defense is fast becoming a floor rather than a ceiling for many allies . In short, the war and Washington’s new approach have jolted Europe into serious action. Europe’s leaders know they may soon have to depend more on their own arsenals and unity, especially if an American-brokered deal freezes the conflict in a way that leaves Ukraine partly occupied or NATO on the sidelines.
The coming weeks will test whether Washington’s gamble on direct bargaining with Moscow can actually yield a peace framework – and whether that can be squared with Ukraine’s independence and Europe’s security. The diplomatic chessboard is complex: Trump’s White House is eager to claim a deal to “end the war,” but not at the cost of appearing to abandon an ally; Putin seeks sanctions relief and strategic gains, yet any overt win for the Kremlin could fracture the Western alliance. Europe, caught in between, is determined not to be a mere spectator. EU leaders are insisting on having their say in any settlement and are prepared to spend and step up to ensure their interests are defended. In Brussels, Paris and Berlin, officials speak openly of a more self-reliant Europe in defense and diplomacy, as if awakening from a long sleep. Should an American-Russian accord materialize, it will mark a dramatic reordering of the security landscape on the continent. Who gains and who gives in will be watched intently from Washington to Warsaw. And if the peace negotiations falter or produce a flawed truce, Europe’s freshly resolved leaders seem ready to forge their own path – arming Ukraine, fortifying their borders and doubling down on the values at stake. In the end, the scramble for peace has underscored a striking reality: after a year of war, both the geopolitical map and the balance of power in Europe are being redrawn in real time. The United States and Russia may be negotiating over the head of Ukraine, but Europe is determined that its interests – and Ukraine’s freedom – are not written out of the script.
One of NATO’s foremost concerns after the war is Russia’s military capacity. Far from being cowed, Moscow poured resources into its armed forces throughout the conflict, converting its economy to a war footing. The result is a dramatic surge in Russian defense spending and output. According to an analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Russia’s military expenditure jumped by 42% in 2024, reaching an estimated $145.9 billion . This figure alone is alarming, but the effective military value of that spending is even more striking when accounting for Russia’s lower production costs and state-driven wartime efficiencies. In fact, after adjusting for purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense budget in 2024 equates to roughly $462 billion in equivalent spending, putting it on par with all of Europe’s collective military outlays .
This spending bonanza has translated into tangible military output. Russia has been “churning out more ammunition in three months than all of NATO’s European members do in a year,” as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned . Such a prodigious rate of production underscores the challenge NATO faces: despite the war’s toll on Russia, its capacity to equip and field forces remains formidable. Moscow’s willingness to devote an estimated 6% or more of its GDP to defense (levels not seen since the Cold War) signals that it is prepared to maintain a large, ready military even after a peace deal. For NATO, this means the threat has not dissipated with a ceasefire. Instead, the alliance must assume that Russia will continue to modernize, rearm, and potentially regroup for as long as its leadership deems necessary. Any post-war “peace dividend” that might tempt European capitals to scale back defense must be weighed against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor to the east.
European NATO members have responded to Russia’s aggression with a historic surge in defense spending – a trend that will need to continue and even accelerate in the post-conflict era. The war acted as a wake-up call, ending decades of underinvestment by many European nations. Since NATO’s 2014 pledge to increase defense budgets, Europe and Canada together have added over $700 billion to their military expenditures . The results became especially visible in the last two years. In 2024 alone, NATO allies in Europe (along with Canada) spent $485 billion on defense, a nearly 20% increase compared to 2023 . About two-thirds of NATO countries have now met or exceeded the alliance’s longstanding guideline of spending at least 2% of GDP on defense , and more are on track to hit that benchmark by 2025. This marks a remarkable shift from just a few years ago, when hitting even the 2% target seemed aspirational for many governments.
Several countries have led the way. Poland, for example, has pushed its defense outlays to around 4% of GDP, the highest proportion in NATO, as it builds up military capacity on NATO’s eastern frontier. The Baltic states and other Eastern flank allies have likewise been spending well above the 2% level, driven by the clear and present danger they perceive from Russia. Major Western European powers – Germany, France, the UK, Italy – have all approved significant budget increases, with Germany launching a special €100 billion defense fund and pledging to meet the 2% GDP target after years below it. These steps indicate a broad recognition in Europe that robust deterrence is necessary to preserve peace.
However, reaching 2% is now viewed by many not as a ceiling but as a starting point. NATO’s 2% benchmark, first agreed in 2006 and reaffirmed in 2014, was symbolic of a minimum commitment to collective defense. In 2023, NATO’s leaders began characterizing the 2% level as “a floor, not a ceiling,” acknowledging that the alliance may require higher spending levels in light of the current threat environment . During the Cold War, most NATO countries regularly spent far more – often 3% or more of GDP on defense – to counter the Soviet military. (For instance, in the 1980s the UK spent around 5% and the United States about 6% of GDP on defense .) Today’s situation, while different, is similarly perilous, and it comes with the added challenge that the United States is less concentrated on Europe than it was during the Cold War . This historical perspective is a sobering reminder that current European spending, even at 2% of GDP, may not be enough to ensure a credible deterrent against a heavily armed Russia.
European allies are also coming to grips with qualitative shortcomings in their defense posture. The war exposed shortfalls in ammunition stockpiles, air and missile defenses, and industrial capacity. As noted, Russia’s defense industry, mobilized for all-out war, vastly outproduced Europe’s in critical areas . To address this, NATO countries have launched initiatives to boost defense industrial output – for example, by coordinating multinational orders for ammunition, investing in production lines, and streamlining procurement processes. NATO’s defense ministers are updating the Defence Production Action Plan to ramp up output of key military goods . The goal is to ensure that Europe can sustain high-intensity operations and not run dry in a protracted crisis. This emphasis on industrial preparedness will remain a top priority after the peace deal, as NATO wants to be ready for any scenario where Russia might test the alliance’s strength.
The future Ukraine-Russia peace deal will also accelerate a broader strategic shift within NATO: a rebalancing of the defense burden more towards Europe. For decades, the United States has provided the backbone of NATO’s military power, accounting for roughly two-thirds of the alliance’s total defense spending . European members, by contrast, have relied on U.S. capabilities for high-end warfare and extended deterrence (notably America’s nuclear umbrella and vast logistics). Now, two factors are pushing a change in this equation. First, U.S. strategic priorities are increasingly global – American leaders from both parties have signaled that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own security so that the U.S. can focus on challenges like China . Second, the political winds in Washington show less appetite for long-running engagements abroad. The peace deal itself was spurred by an American initiative to “stop the killing,” and it came with clear expectations that Europe step up. U.S. officials bluntly told allies that European militaries will be expected to carry most of the security burden on the continent going forward .
This message has been reinforced at the highest levels. There are suggestions from Washington that NATO’s 2% GDP spending target may need to increase to 2.5% or even 3-5% in the coming years . Such calls, once unthinkable, illustrate how dramatically the landscape has shifted. While not all allies will rush to 5% of GDP, the direction is clear: Europe must build far greater capacity to defend itself and lead regional security efforts. The NATO Secretary-General (now hailing from Europe’s ranks) has echoed this urgency, warning that current spending levels are insufficient given Russia’s military buildup . If Europeans do not “ramp up fast,” they risk a security gap emerging on the continent as the U.S. reallocates resources elsewhere.
Another implication of this shifting burden is the incentive for European nations to improve cooperation and integration in defense. Efforts like joint EU-NATO initiatives, EU defense fund projects, and regional frameworks (e.g. the Joint Expeditionary Force led by the UK, or France’s European Intervention Initiative) may gain momentum as complements to NATO. The peace deal’s aftermath could even revive discussions on a stronger European pillar within NATO or more self-sufficient European defense arrangements, to ensure that even with somewhat less American involvement, Russia is deterred from any aggression. The bottom line is that NATO’s European members are expected – by the U.S. and by their own citizens – to take on leadership in protecting Europe. This is a profound evolution for an alliance that historically leaned on American might, and it will shape NATO’s policies and capabilities development for years to come.
NATO countries should treat the longstanding 2% of GDP defense spending guideline as a minimum rather than a cap. Given Russia’s massive wartime mobilization, European allies may need to significantly exceed 2% to ensure a credible deterrent. There are already calls to raise the target to 3% or more, and U.S. officials have even suggested aiming for 5% of GDP in defense spending for those who can afford it . The alliance is likely to formally declare 2% as “a floor, not a ceiling” for defense budgets moving forward . Sustained higher investment will fund the new brigades, fighter squadrons, and naval assets required to bolster NATO’s eastern defenses and rapid response forces. It will also signal to Moscow that the alliance is fully committed to defending every inch of its territory.
Simply allocating money is not enough – NATO states must convert budgets into real capabilities by expanding their defense industrial base. The war exposed that Europe’s arms production was far too slow and fragmented. Going forward, allies will collaborate to produce more munitions, vehicles, and weapons systems at scale. Joint procurement programs and investments in manufacturing will help close the gap with Russia’s output. NATO reports highlight that Russia’s wartime industry outpaced all of Europe’s combined, especially in ammunition production . To avoid being outmatched in a future conflict, European factories need to operate at a wartime tempo in peacetime, building stockpiles and surge capacity. Strengthening supply chains and standardizing equipment across allies will also make NATO more resilient and inter-operable.
A durable lesson for Europe is the importance of strategic autonomy within the alliance. European members should develop the ability to defend the continent largely on their own if necessary, ensuring that NATO Europe can hold the line even with a lighter U.S. footprint. This means improving everything from air and missile defense to intelligence and logistics capabilities at the European level. The United States currently contributes the lion’s share of high-end capabilities, and Europe’s militaries would be hard-pressed in a long war without American support . This imbalance must be addressed. European allies are now urgently pursuing ways to lessen their dependence on U.S. assets , for instance by investing in next-generation fighter jets (like the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS project), developing their own missile shield architectures, and expanding multinational battlegroups. While the U.S. will remain a key part of NATO, a more self-reliant Europe will make the alliance stronger and more politically balanced – and it answers American calls for fairer burden-sharing.
Even outside of NATO membership, Ukraine’s security is intertwined with NATO’s interests. To prevent a relapse into conflict, NATO members (particularly those in Europe) must commit to Ukraine’s long-term defense. This could involve a package of security guarantees or arrangements for military assistance that persist well beyond the peace treaty. Continued training of Ukrainian forces, supply of advanced weapons, and integration of Ukraine into NATO’s planning processes (via the NATO-Ukraine Council and other forums) will help embed Ukraine in the Western security architecture. The principle of credible deterrence is key – Russia must see that any attempt to violate the peace will be met with a coordinated and potent response. Analysts note that without such deterrence, Europe would remain perpetually vulnerable to future aggression despite any signed peace deal . Therefore, NATO’s role will likely include helping Ukraine rebuild its defenses and possibly maintaining a rotational presence of allied troops in nearby NATO countries to signal readiness. Ensuring Ukraine can defend itself is not just about that country’s sovereignty; it also bolsters NATO’s eastern flank by keeping an aggressive Russia in check.
The Ukraine-Russia peace deal may conclude a bloody chapter of open warfare, but for NATO it opens a new chapter of strategic adaptation. The alliance now faces the task of securing a “long peace” in Europe – one built on strength, unity, and vigilance. NATO’s evolving role will be characterized by a heavier European load, both financially and militarily, in keeping the continent safe. Hard-won increases in defense spending across Europe must not only be maintained but likely grown further to address the realities of a rearmed Russia. As NATO rebalances, it will strive to close the gap between Russian and European military capabilities, whether in budgets, equipment stockpiles, or industrial output.
Crucially, NATO must also remain cohesive and committed to its core purpose of collective defense. The alliance’s credibility will depend on matching words with deeds: investing in forces and infrastructure, preparing for worst-case scenarios, and deterring any temptation by adversaries to test the resolve of its members. There is cautious optimism that the peace deal can usher in stability, but no complacency – both recent history and Russia’s ongoing militarization warn against letting down one’s guard. As Secretary-General Rutte cautioned, if allied defense efforts stagnate now, security on the continent could again be put in peril . In essence, NATO’s message for the time after the war might be that peace must be safeguarded through strength. By learning the lessons of the conflict and acting on them, NATO might aim to ensure that any hard-won peace endures, with a stronger Europe standing firm alongside North America in the defense of shared values and territory.
